A State Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Intrastate Conflicts in Multistate Challenges to the Affordable Care Act by Johnstone, Anthony
BYU Law Review 
Volume 2019 Issue 6 Article 7 
Summer 9-1-2020 
A State Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Intrastate Conflicts in Multistate 
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act 
Anthony Johnstone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons, and the State and 
Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony Johnstone, A State Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Intrastate Conflicts in Multistate Challenges to the 
Affordable Care Act, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 1471 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2019/iss6/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Brigham Young University Law School




A State Is a “They,” Not an “It”: 
Intrastate Conflicts in Multistate Challenges  
to the Affordable Care Act  
Anthony Johnstone* 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1471 
I. FEDERALISM, THE STATES, AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL .......................... 1477 
II. WHO SPEAKS FOR STATES ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT? ....................... 1481 
A. The Health Care Cases ............................................................................ 1484 
B. Legislators and Medicaid, Governors and Exchanges ........................ 1487 
C. King v. Burwell .......................................................................................... 1491 
D. Hobby Lobby and Zubik v. Burwell ........................................................... 1492 
E. Texas v. United States ................................................................................ 1494 
III. HOW TO SPEAK FOR THE STATES MORE CLEARLY ...................................... 1498 
A. Lessons for the States .............................................................................. 1500 
1. Intrastate Independence ................................................................. 1500 
2. Interstate and National Independence ......................................... 1502 
B. Lessons for the Courts ............................................................................. 1503 
1. Clarifying accountability in doctrine ............................................ 1503 
2. Clarifying accountability in procedure ......................................... 1506 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 1507 
APPENDIX: STATES ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ....................................... 1509 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Who speaks for a state? The law conceives of states as unitary 
legal actors. Even the simple appearance of “the State” in court, 
 
*   Helen & David Mason Professor of Law, University of Montana Blewett School of 
Law. I introduced a portion of this article in Anthony Johnstone, Foreword: The Future of 
Federalism, from the Bottom Up, 76 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2015). Thanks to the participants in the 
State Enforcement in a Multistate World symposium for a valuable discussion, the editors of 
BYU Law Review for their patience and suggestions, Elizabeth Webster and McKenna Ford 
for editorial and research assistance, and my family for their support. 
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however, conceals a complex intersection of state officials acting in 
a range of legal roles. Take for example the various authorities 
represented in the topside of the caption in a typical criminal case. 
The lawyer appearing for “the State” may work for a prosecutor 
elected at the local level and supervised by the state attorney 
general, enforcing a law enacted by a legislature elected in districts 
across the state, which is interpreted by trial and appellate courts 
that may be elected locally or statewide,  or appointed by an elected 
governor. Should that lawyer’s case land in the federal courts, 
however, the lawyer may be asked to speak for all three branches 
and their system of overlapping constituencies as “the State.” The 
same is true of state lawyers on either side of civil litigation, 
including constitutional litigation defending state law or 
challenging federal law, where they must advance a constructed 
“state interest” defined by legal and political imperatives.  
Like Congress,1 the executive branch,2 and the judiciary,3 a state 
is a “they,” not an “it.”4 Each state contains its own separation of 
powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Yet 
the states are even more plural than the federal government. States 
further divide their executive branches,5 and sometimes even their 
courts of last resort.6 Beyond structure, distinctions among the 
 
 1.  Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
 2.  Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is 
a “They,” Not an “It”, 96 MINN. L. REV. 194 (2011). 
 3.  Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy 
of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). 
 4.  Professor Roderick M. Hills offered a classic statement of this phenomenon:  
[I]n discussions about American federalism, it is common to speak of a “state 
government” as if it were a black box, an individual speaking with a single voice. 
State governments are, of course, no such thing. Rather, a “state” actually 
incorporates a bundle of different subdivisions, branches, and agencies controlled 
by politicians who often compete with each other for electoral success and 
governmental power. In particular, these institutions compete with each other for 
the power to control federal funds and implement federal programs. 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials 
from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1999). 
 5.  William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, 
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006) (contrasting the state model 
of the divided executive with the federal model of the unitary executive). 
 6.  See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have final 
appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the state . . . .”); Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated 
Appellate Review: The Texas Story of Two High Courts, 53 JUDGES J. 30 (2014). 
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powers and duties of each branch,7 and between the officers within 
each branch,8 add layers of comparative complexity to state 
governments. Most of these officers are independently elected, 
even within the executive branch, which introduces a 
fundamentally different model of political accountability than 
exists anywhere within the “jurisdictional chaos”9 of federal 
agencies ultimately accountable (directly or indirectly) to a single 
elected official.10 Subsidiarity within the states—an “Our 
Localism”11 that functions distinctly from “Our Federalism”12—
also takes a variety of forms in the organization of local 
governments under states’ authority. This diversity in state 
political structures, and its divergence from the federal model, is 
 
 7.  For example, many state constitutions authorize, and some require, the state 
supreme court to issue advisory opinions. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“The judges of the 
supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested 
by the governor or by either house of the general assembly.”). See generally Helen Hershkoff, 
State Courts and the Passive Virtues: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 
1836 (2001) (“State courts . . . are not bound by Article III, and judicial practice in some states 
differs—and differs radically—from the federal model.”). State attorneys general also give 
legal opinions, and in a few states, those opinions effectively operate as binding law. See 
EMILY MYERS, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 85 (4th ed. 2018). 
 8.  For example, states typically allocate consumer protection duties across a range 
of executive branch offices including the attorney general, conventional executive branch 
agencies headed by a gubernatorial appointee, elected public service commissions, and 
elected commissioners of agriculture, banking, insurance, or securities, among others. See 
generally State Consumer Protection Offices, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/state-consumer 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2019). For example, Florida separately elects an attorney general, a chief 
financial officer, and a commissioner of agriculture and consumer services, each with 
consumer protection duties. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.203(2) (West 2017) (Attorney General’s 
Department of Legal Affairs); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.307(10) (West 2017) (Chief Financial 
Officer’s Department of Consumer Services); FLA. STAT. ANN. 570.07(36)-(37) (West 2018) 
(Commissioner’s Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services). 
 9.  David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, State Enforcement in a Polycentric World, 
2019 BYU. L. REV. 1447, 1460. 
 10.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2317 (2001) 
(“[T]he President, in relation to these other actors, has attained an ever greater capacity to 
oversee, to supervise, and even to direct administrative action.”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513 (2010) (“The Constitution that makes the 
President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him the power to do 
so.”). 
 11.  Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV 1, 2 (1990) (Briffault defines “Our Localism” as “the legal powers of contem-
porary American local governments, the practical social and political ramifications of local 
legal power in a system characterized by wide divergences in local fiscal capabilities and 
needs and the ideological commitment to localism that sustains and legitimates local 
autonomy.”). 
 12.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
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underappreciated.13 All of these branches, all of these officers, and 
all of these levels of state government may claim to speak for the 
states in legal proceedings. 
While a growing body of scholarship, including this 
Symposium, addresses the functions of state litigation in our 
federal system, its main concern is when and where states may speak 
in court, rather than who speaks for the State.14 The conventional 
model of the state attorney general bringing cases as a party, or 
joining cases as an amicus curiae, is assumed.15 Yet the rise of state 
public law litigation is accompanied by a diffusion of legal actors 
who claim to speak for the State in that litigation. Like the subjects 
of multistate litigation itself, partisan dynamics in who claims to 
speak for the State track trends of partisan mobilization across 
states and between the states and the federal government. As the 
captions in multistate litigation increasingly align along partisan 
lines, the titles of state officials claiming to speak for the state 
increasingly extend to governors, legislators, and others. 
This article examines the pluralism of state constitutional 
politics through the lens of the states’ responses to the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA, or “the Act”) over the past decade. Although the 
Act was conceived as a model of cooperative federalism, its broad 
policy scope and deep impacts on states and their citizens invited 
state partisan mobilization for and against the law even before 
Congress enacted it.16 The Act depends on executive and legislative 
branches of state governments to implement two of its key 
 
 13.  See generally Anthony Johnstone, The Federalist Safeguards of Politics, 39 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 415 (2016). 
 14.  For exceptions, see Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2015); Hills, Jr., supra note 4; David Schleicher, Federalism and 
State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 795–98 (2017). A comprehensive overview of state-level 
policy developments under the Affordable Care Act, including intrastate debates enabled by 
the Act’s federalism provisions, is Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in 
Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica 
Turret, The Affordable Care Act's Litigation Decade, 108 GEO. L.J. 1471 (2020). 
 15.  See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation in a Dual Court System, 2019 BYU L. 
REV. 1551 (2020) (discussing state attorney general authority relative to federal courts in mass 
actions context). But see Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 9, at 1449 (“[R]ecent scholarship has 
recognized the possibility of plural interests within an individual state—such as when the 
AG is from one political party, and the governor is from another political party.”). 
 16.  See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State Based Dissent 
to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 113–18 (2010) (summarizing how state 
challenges to the Act predated its enactment and “continued, escalated, and morphed” over 
the Act’s first year). 
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elements, health insurance exchanges and Medicaid expansion 
respectively. The need for state implementation provided multiple 
points for federal-state policy coordination, and, in many states, 
federal-state political contestation.17 These policy and political 
disputes immediately spilled into court. There state officials, led by 
attorneys general, reframed the Act’s policies as presenting a series 
of constitutional questions that would reshape the Act itself.  
On the day President Obama signed the Act into law, state 
attorneys general joined other parties to challenge it on 
constitutional grounds. These state executives, mobilizing almost 
exclusively along national Republican Party lines, repeatedly asked 
the federal judiciary to invalidate or rewrite the Act.18 Meanwhile, 
Democratic attorneys general lined up to defend the Act, joining a 
debate over the meaning of federalism itself. When the state 
challenges succeeded in Florida v. Dept. of Health & Human Serv. 
(consolidated with NFIB v. Sebelius and U.S. Dept. of Health & 
Human Serv. V. Florida as “the Health Care Cases”),19 the attorneys 
general changed the rules of federal-state engagement under the 
Act by providing their executive and legislative counterparts 
grounds for resistance that Congress did not originally provide (in 
the case of Medicaid expansion) or foresee (in the case of state 
exchanges). Encouraged by their early success and motivated by 
the failure of their co-partisans in Congress to repeal the Act, the 
attorneys general returned to court again and again over the 
decade, as parties and amici curiae, culminating in a battle to 
dismantle the Act in Texas v. United States, now pending in the 
Supreme Court. 
The bright partisan lines of red-state attacks on the Act, and 
blue-state defenses of it, obscure a more complicated political 
 
 17.  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1701. 
 18. The one Democrat, Louisiana Attorney General Buddy Caldwell, switched from 
Democrat to Republican shortly after joining the lawsuit. Attorney General Buddy  
Caldwell Switches to Republican, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Feb. 3, 2011), 
https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_69bf659c-7815-5d9f-912b-
f430c0ecb373.html. 
 19.  NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). The case involved three consolidated 
petitions: NFIB v. Sebelius (No. 11-393), a challenge brought by individuals to the individual 
mandate; and U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv. v. Florida (No. 11-398) and Florida v. 
Dept. of Health & Human Serv. (No. 11-400), cross-petitions in a challenge brought by states 
to the Medicaid expansion (and related issues of severability and the Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act). This Article will refer to the consolidated cases as “the Health Care Cases” in the text. 
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reality on the ground in the states. The Act passed along party lines 
in the Senate, and thirty-four Democrats joined all Republicans 
voting against it in the House.20 State officials’ responses to the Act 
would break from Congressional party politics for a couple of 
reasons. First, state officials did not always track national partisan 
alignments on the Act. Second, state officials engaged with the Act 
over a decade in which the parties in power changed in many 
states. Every state, through its attorney general and sometimes its 
governor and legislators, has weighed in on litigation over the Act 
at some point in the past decade, most of them repeatedly.  
More than half of the states rendered a mixed verdict on the 
Act, supporting some of its elements and opposing others. At least 
half of the Congressional delegations in 30 states, measured as the 
average of House and Senate vote shares, supported the Act on 
final passage. Of these, 17 states would take at least one position 
opposed to the Act, either challenging it in court or refusing to 
adopt Medicaid expansion or a state exchange. Of the 20 states with 
Congressional delegations opposed to the Act at its final passage, 
nine would take at least one position in support of the Act, either 
defending the Act in court, expanding Medicaid, or establishing a 
state exchange. In the courts alone, several attorneys general 
switched positions—or voters switched attorneys general—at some 
point during the Act’s legal saga. In several states, officials other 
than the attorney general joined the courtroom scrum, sometimes 
lining up directly opposite the state’s chief legal officer in attempts 
to give voice to other state interests. These intrastate conflicts 
challenge simple models of partisan federalism and raise difficult 
questions of federalism and state power in an emerging regime of 
state public law litigation.21 
This article proceeds in three parts. First, it introduces the office 
of state attorney general and the role of attorneys general in 
national policymaking through litigation. State attorneys general 
increasingly engage in ideologically charged multistate litigation 
with the federal government and reinforce national party lines 
 
 20.  “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Roll Vote No. 396 Leg.,” 155 Cong. 
Rec. S13891 (Dec. 24, 2009); “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Roll No. 165,” 156 
Cong. Rec. H2153 (Mar 21, 2010). 
 21.  See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in 
an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 95–96 (2018). 
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when doing so. Second, the article sketches out this new regime, 
taking as its model several landmark challenges that mobilized a 
wide majority of state attorneys general in opposition to, or support 
of, the Affordable Care Act over the past decade. This new regime 
includes other state actors too: state legislatures that enacted 
Medicaid expansion under the Act, state governors who 
established health insurance exchanges under the Act, and some 
actors from both groups appearing in litigation, as parties or amici, 
aligned with or opposed to their state’s position taken by its 
attorney general. Third, the article suggests some doctrinal 
implications of this new regime for separation of powers under 
state constitutions and federalism doctrine under the United States 
Constitution, as well as procedural implications for the handling of 
these cases by the Supreme Court and other federal courts. 
I. FEDERALISM, THE STATES, AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
From McCulloch v. Maryland22 to Massachusetts v. EPA23 the 
standard model of state litigation against the federal government 
centers on the state attorney general. Most states provided for an 
attorney general, an office inherited from England through the 
colonies, in their first constitutions.24 Typically state constitutions 
describe the attorney general as “the legal officer” of the state.25 
Although there is significant variation among the states, most states 
recognize broad common law or statutory authority for the 
attorney general to represent the state’s interests in litigation.26 
Through cooperation with, and resistance to, the federal 
government in litigation, attorneys general shape federalism as 
both political and legal actors.27 The standard model plays out 
mainly along an orbital plane, gravitating from state capitols to 
Washington, D.C., and radiating back, between an indivisible state 
 
 22.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 372 (1819) (Luther Martin, 
Attorney General, appearing for Maryland). 
 23.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007) (Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney 
General, appearing for Massachusetts). 
 24.  EMILY MYERS, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 7 (4th 
ed. 2018). 
 25.  Id. at 92, 520–21. 
 26.  Id. at 93. 
 27.  Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 598–609 (2018). 
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and (less often) a monolithic federal government. This model has 
the virtue of simplicity, but it is incomplete. 
As early as McCulloch,28 Chief Justice John Marshall provided a 
lasting reminder of the multiple sources of popular sovereignty in 
a federal system. When the people act at the federal level, “they act 
in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, 
cease to be the measures of the people themselves. . . .”29 Chief 
Justice Marshall spoke of the constitutional ratification process, but 
he could just as well have been describing how the people act in 
their states, through the mediation of state laws,30 to choose 
Congressional delegations,31 and presidential electors.32 Similarly, 
the people express their sovereignty at the state level by electing 
and empowering multiple state officials with competing duties to 
legislate, execute, and adjudicate state policies.33 In federalism 
doctrine, the usual attention is on the radial or vertical separation 
of the people’s “two political capacities, one state and one federal, 
each protected from incursion by the other.”34 Federalism doctrine 
also should attend to the horizontal separation of the people’s 
political capacities within the states. 
The Court’s lack of attention to the states’ distinct political 
structures weakens its conventional rationales for certain federalism-
promoting rules. According to the Court’s federalism doctrine, for 
example, the genius of dual sovereignty also presents a danger of 
 
 28.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 29.  Id. at 403. 
 30.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof . . . .”). 
 31.  See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”); id. amend. XVII 
(“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected 
by the people thereof, for six years . . . .”). 
 32.  See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). 
 33.   See generally Johnstone, supra note 13, at 443–67. 
 34.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political 
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The 
resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing 
two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set 
of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”). 
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misplaced accountability. In order for citizens to exercise their two 
political capacities properly, they must know which government is 
acting on their behalf. When both government jurisdictions overlap, 
as they often do in the contemporary constitutional order, bright 
lines such as the anti-commandeering rule must be drawn to 
preserve political accountability between voters and the government 
actors responsible for a particular policy.  
Maintaining accountability within these separate spheres is a 
central theme of New York v. United States: “[W]here the Federal 
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials 
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal 
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”35 The translation 
of this accountability principle from an anti-commandeering rule 
to a more general anti-coercion rule of cooperative federalism36 was 
the crucial move in the Health Care Cases that led to the invalidation 
of the Medicaid expansion requirement. According to a seven-
member majority on the Court, “[p]ermitting the Federal Govern-
ment to force the States to implement a federal program would 
threaten the political accountability key to our federal system,” 
otherwise, “when the State has no choice, the Federal Government 
can achieve its objectives without accountability. . . .”37 The 
solution to the accountability problem is to give states a choice in 
adopting the federal policy: “States may now choose to reject 
[Medicaid] expansion; that is the whole point.”38 
 
 35.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). This accountability concern 
can be overstated in the anti-commandeering context, as demonstrated by the political 
situation in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 957 & n.18 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Sheriff Jay Printz, himself an elected official, did not need the Supreme Court to tell the gun 
buyers of his Montana county who was behind the Brady Act’s background checks. In 1994, 
the year after the Brady Act’s passage, Ravalli County’s electorate voted by more than a 2-
to-1 margin for Senator Conrad Burns, who opposed the Brady Act. See MONT. SEC. OF ST., 
1994 Statewide General Canvass 3 (updated Nov. 5, 1996), https://sosmt.gov/ 
Portals/142/Elections/archives/1990s/1994/1994gen.pdf. In 1996, President Bill Clinton, 
who signed the Brady Act, went on to win only thirty-one percent of the vote in Ravalli 
County. See MONT. SEC. OF ST., 1996 Statewide General Canvass 3 (updated Dec. 10, 1999), 
https://sosmt.gov/Portals/142/Elections/archives/1990s/1996/1996gen.pdf . 
 36.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“[I]n some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937))). 
 37.  NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012). 
 38.  Id. at 587. 
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The Court considered how states could respond to the choice it 
now offered under the Act: “Some States may indeed decline to 
participate, either because they are unsure they will be able to 
afford their share of the new funding obligations, or because they 
are unwilling to commit the administrative resources necessary to 
support the expansion.”39 Alternatively, the Court suggested, 
“[o]ther states . . . may voluntarily sign up, finding the idea of 
expanding Medicaid coverage attractive, particularly given the 
level of federal funding the Act offers at the outset.”40 What is 
striking about this discussion, and the Court’s federalism rhetoric 
more generally, is the monolithic “state” that is the subject of its 
analysis. A “state” sued to vindicate its sovereignty; a “state” won 
a choice to opt out of the Medicaid expansion; a “state” either did 
or did not opt out; and, thanks to the Court, a “state” was 
accountable to the people for its choice. This is too simple even as 
to the Medicaid expansion itself. After all, state attorneys general 
challenged Medicaid expansion, but state legislators would decide 
whether to implement it. Despite common federalism shorthand, a 
“state” comprises many different political actors, each indepen-
dently elected and accountable to the state’s citizens in ways the 
courts have failed to consider. 
At times, some Justices are more sensitive to the various 
political offices and interests that each lay claim to the title of 
“state.” In New York, where an elected state attorney general sued 
notwithstanding the fact that “[a] Deputy Commissioner of the 
State’s Energy Office testified in favor of the Act” and “Senator 
Moynihan of New York spoke in support of the Act on the floor of 
the Senate,” the Court held that a “departure from the constitu-
tional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”41 In 
United States v. Comstock,42 twenty-nine States appeared as amici to 
support the federal civil commitment law at issue, which, not 
coincidentally, assumed the financial burden of civil commitment 
from the States.43 Dissenting, Justice Thomas reiterated that federal 
power “does not expand merely to suit the States’ policy 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992). 
 42.  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
 43.  Id. at 179 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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preferences, or to allow state officials to avoid difficult choices 
regarding the allocation of state funds.”44 
In both of these cases, however, the state officials are taken as a 
unified whole in their consent to the exercise of federal power, 
whether it is commandeering in New York or the necessary and 
proper extension of commerce power in Comstock. But as the 
attorney general’s presence in New York demonstrated, different 
state officials have different roles and a “state’s” authority to accept 
or reject federal law is structured by state law. The justices’ analyses 
would have benefitted from an acknowledgement that it was not 
simply “state officials” who consented due to their policy 
preferences, but a set of separately elected executive and legislative 
officials whose views of “the States’ policy preferences” might  work 
at cross-purposes.45 Instead of acting inconsistently or strategically, 
the state officials may be playing out the same checks and balances 
the Court celebrates and reinforces at the federal level. The Court 
disrespects dual sovereignty when it neglects how States structure 
their governments and does not hear the voices of the State that its 
own citizens choose to speak through on particular issues. 
II. WHO SPEAKS FOR STATES ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT? 
The States’ varied responses to the Affordable Care Act of 2010 
demonstrate a complex dynamic of litigation, legislation, and 
regulation that cannot be captured on the caption of a Supreme 
Court brief. In their engagement with federal policies, state officials 
function across the range of modes recognized in American 
federalism. Dean Heather Gerken helpfully classifies them: “the de 
jure autonomy associated with the sovereignty account; the de facto 
autonomy associated with process federalism; and the power of the 
servant, which is the best way to conceptualize state power in 
cooperative federal regimes.”46  
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  But see New York, 505 U.S. at 200 (White, J., dissenting in part) (noting “to say, 
as the Court does, that the incursion on state sovereignty ‘cannot be ratified by the “consent” 
of state officials,’ is flatly wrong,” and arguing that the State should be estopped from 
challenging a federal law from which it derived substantial advantages). 
 46.  Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012). 
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All three modes are at work in the legal and political debate 
over the Affordable Care Act.47 On the campaign trail, the process 
federalism account dominates as state legislators and governors 
position themselves in campaigns and governance for or against 
the federal policy at the statehouse. At the courthouse, dual 
sovereignty claims dominate as the state attorneys general ask the 
Supreme Court to police the federal government’s trespass beyond 
its delegated powers into the state sphere of reserved powers. In 
the wake of the split decision in the Health Care Cases, and with the 
Court’s blessing, states revert to a cooperative federalism mode of 
negotiation and implementation of federal policy on the states’ 
terms. In sum, voters mobilized state officials (alongside federal 
officials) to oppose the Act through process federalism, some of 
those state officials rewrote the Act’s terms in court through 
sovereignty federalism, which gave other state officials new lever-
age to implement the Act through servant federalism.  
The fulcrum in this account of federalism is the state 
constitutional challenge to the Act, led by attorneys general, in the 
Health Care Cases. This marked the culmination of growing 
federalism conflicts along two axes: vertical between the states and 
the federal administration and horizontal among the states 
themselves.48 Professors Margaret Lemos and Ernest Young 
distinguish between the two: vertical conflicts concern the scope of 
federal power and “each state’s right to go its own way,” while in 
horizontal conflicts, some states try to impose their policy prefer-
ences on other states in “fights for the right to control national 
policy.”49 As Professors Lemos and Young explain, most state liti-
gation over the Affordable Care Act appears to be a vertical conflict 
over federalism, but it has become a horizontal conflict due to the 
national scale and interconnectedness of health care reform—a 
state’s decision “to go its own way” without universal insurance 
coverage as a matter of federalism may undermine the policy’s 
efficacy in other states.50 These two types of conflicts increasingly 
 
 47.  See Leonard, supra note 16, at 160, tbl. 3 (mapping state responses to ACA onto 
state sovereignty and servant accounts of federalism). 
 48.  See Paul Nolette, State Litigation During the Obama Administration: Diverging 
Agendas in an Era of Polarized Politics, 44 PUBLIUS 451, 457 (2014). 
 49.   Lemos & Young, supra note 21. 
 50.   Id. at 95, 99. 
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take place along national party lines, mobilizing partisan opposition 
or support relative to the party in power at the federal level, in what 
Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen calls “partisan federalism.”51 At 
the same time, what I have termed “the nationalization of state 
politics,” increasingly uniform federal regulation and deregulation 
imposed on state election laws, eases the entry of national partisan 
actors.52 The intensified politics of the Act drove national party lines 
right through states themselves, overwhelming local distinctions in 
political structures and interests. State officials on each side of the 
partisan divide then claimed to represent the state’s interests from 
different offices. 
Within states, the diverse configurations of policy choices on 
the issue make it difficult to discern a “state’s” choice in anything 
more than a formal sense, even when considering a single choice in 
isolation. Iterated over multiple policy and political cycles, the 
monoliths of state positions for or against a given federal policy 
fracture into shifting coalitions that often run across state offices 
and sometimes place officials of the same state on opposite sides  
of the same case. Emphasizing the role of governors and state 
legislatures, Professors Abbe Gluck and Nicole Huberfeld find 
“[d]ivergences in state law and divergences among the internal 
state actors—in other words attributes of the state sovereign 
apparatuses—are critical to how federal-law implementation occurs 
on the ground.”53 State litigators, primarily attorneys general, also 
are a central part of each state’s sovereign apparatus, both challen-
ging and defending the implementation of federal law.  
The states’ positions in the decade-long litigation of the 
Affordable Care Act, and their reactions to each decision of the 
courts, demonstrate this dynamic in five acts. First, attorneys general 
and other state officials challenged and defended the Act’s 
individual mandate and Medicaid expansion in the Health Care 
Cases (2010). Second, governors and state legislatures decided 
whether or not to expand Medicaid with the option the Court 
 
 51.  Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (2014); see 
also Lemos & Young, supra note 21, at 101 (“In an interconnected economy such as ours, one 
state’s autonomy will sometimes be another state’s shackles, and we should not be surprised 
that many such policy disagreements play out along partisan lines.”). 
 52.  See also Johnstone, supra note 13, at 434–42 (critiquing the “nationalization of state 
politics” through federal election law). 
 53.  Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1776. 
003.JOHNSTONE_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:21 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1484 
 
provided in the Health Care Cases, and whether or not to implement 
the Act through state-established health insurance exchanges 
beginning in 2014. Third, attorneys general and other state officials 
challenged and defended the availability of tax subsidies for 
insurance bought on state exchanges established by the federal 
government in King v. Burwell (2014). Fourth, attorneys general and 
other state officials challenged and defended contraceptive cover-
age rules promulgated under the Act in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) 
and Zubik v. Burwell (2016). Fifth, after Congress zeroed-out the tax 
penalty for the individual mandate, attorneys general and other state 
officials are challenging and defending the validity of the entire Act 
in Texas v. United States, now at the Supreme Court. 
A. The Health Care Cases 
Despite the multitude of state actors who mobilized in the 
Health Care Cases and subsequent litigation, the federal courts 
responded with indifference to the States’ diverse infrastructures 
supporting the litigation and the policy responses to the outcome 
of the case.54 As the Court noted, “[o]n the day the President signed 
the [Affordable Care] Act into law, Florida and 12 other States filed 
a complaint,”55 and each of those States was represented by their 
constitutional officers responsible for litigation—thirteen attorneys 
general in all.56 Indeed, the lead plaintiff pleaded the attorney 
general’s conventional role: 
The State of Florida is a sovereign state and protector of the 
individual freedom, public health, and welfare of its citizens and 
residents. Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, has been 
 
 54.  Elizabeth B. Wydra noted the point at the time. See Elizabeth B. Wydra, Who Really 
Represents the States in the Health Care Cases?, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2012, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/who-really-represents-the_b_1381334?guccounter=1 
(“Thirteen states and more than 500 legislators from each of the 50 states have filed briefs 
with the Supreme Court strongly disagreeing with the challenger states’ legal position and 
their flawed, historically-inaccurate view of federalism.” (citing Supreme Court Amici Brief – 





 55.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 540 (2012). 
 56.  Complaint, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00091). 
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directly elected by the people of Florida to serve as their chief legal 
officer and exercises broad statutory and common law authority 
to protect the rights of the State of Florida and its people; Fla. 
Const. art. IV, § 4(b). The State, by and through the Attorney 
General, has standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the Act. 
He is authorized to appear in and attend all suits in which the 
state is interested. § 16.02(4) & (5), Fla. Stat.57 
Yet when the Court continued to explain how these parties 
“were subsequently joined by 13 more States, several individuals, 
and the National Federation of Independent Business,”58 it was 
mistaken. Iowa, Mississippi, and Nevada were represented by their 
governors despite the attorneys’ general independent legal status 
and traditional authority under state law to represent the state in 
court.59 These states’ attorneys general declined to join the 
litigation, and Iowa’s attorney general would appear in an amicus 
brief on the opposing side.  Wyoming’s Governor also appeared in 
the case on behalf of his state instead of its attorney general, even 
though the attorney general is appointed by the Governor and 
serves at his pleasure.60  The Court took no note of the distinction 
between the attorneys general who represented their States and 
governors who represented only their offices.61 Neither did the four 
dissenting Justices, who referred to the “the 26 States that brought 
this suit.”62 In the most significant federalism decision of the new 
century, the Court mistook who actually spoke for the States.63 
As a technical matter of standing, the distinction made no 
difference. The only mention of who actually purported to speak 
for the states in the Health Care Cases arose in Florida’s challenge to 
the individual mandate, when the district court held the ”[t]he 
States of Idaho and Utah, through plaintiff Attorneys General 
 
 57.  See id. at 12; see also Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268–69 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (recounting the broad common law powers of the state attorney general). 
 58.  NFIB, 567 U.S. at 540. 
 59.  See IOWA CONST. art. V, § 12; MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 173; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 19. 
 60.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1-202, -601 (West 2019). 
 61.  See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 524–28 (listing each state representative who appeared in the 
case). 
 62.  NFIB, 567 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 63.   When not otherwise indicated, a reference to “states” as parties or amici curiae 
presumes the attorney general is representing the State as its constitutional legal officer. 
“State plaintiffs,” with state as the modifier, refers to the broader category of officials who 
claim to speak for the State. 
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Lawrence G. Wasden and Mark L. Shurtleff, have standing to 
prosecute this case based on statutes duly passed by their 
legislatures, and signed into law by their Governors.”64 Therefore, 
the district court reasoned, it was unnecessary to consider the 
standing of other state plaintiffs, including those represented by 
their governors.65 The court’s reliance on this conservative view of 
attorney general standing—dependent upon the consent of the 
legislature and the governor despite the attorney general’s 
generally independent constitutional authority as the legal officer 
of the state—highlighted the other officials’ lack of such authority, 
either as a general constitutional matter or under specific 
legislation. On the other side of the case, Iowa’s Attorney General 
actually represented the State of Iowa in an amicus 
brief supporting Medicaid expansion, even though the state’s 
governor already represented the state according to the Court. 
Meanwhile, Washington’s Governor appeared on the same amicus 
brief instead of that state’s Attorney General.66 Both Iowa’s 
Attorney General and Washington’s Governor were Democrats. 
Unlike the Court, the state attorneys general recognized the state 
separation of powers issue and listed Washington’s Governor as 
appearing in her official capacity as governor, but not in a 
representative capacity as the state itself.67 Justice Ginsburg’s 
partial concurrence, at least, acknowledged this nuance in citing the 
brief.68 
 
 64.  Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1272 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 65.  See id. But see Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that not even a state attorney general had standing to challenge the individual 
mandate). 
 66.  See Brief of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Florida v. 
Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 588460 [hereinafter 
Brief of Oregon] (supporting Medicaid expansion). California filed a separate brief 
supporting severability. See Brief of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Florida v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 
11-400), 2012 WL 293712. 
 67.  See Brief of Oregon, supra note 66, at 1. 
 68.  See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 598–99 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing “Brief for Governor of Washington Christine Gregoire as Amicus Curiae” and 
“Brief for Commonwealth of Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae”). 
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B. Legislators and Medicaid, Governors and Exchanges 
Once the Court in the Health Care Cases gave the states a choice 
of whether or not to expand Medicaid, the litigating states split 
along several different policy paths. As Professors Gluck and 
Huberfeld explain, “[a] clear learn-and-response pattern mater-
ialized” among and within states, “with governors and legislators 
of the same (typically Republican) party at odds on whether and 
how to expand.”69  States where the executive sued for the right to 
reject the Medicaid expansion and the legislature exercised that 
right to reject it might be called “winners,” at least by the logic of 
the Health Care Cases. They fought for an opt-out from the Act, won 
it, and used it to decline Medicaid expansion. States where the 
executive sued but the legislature adopted Medicaid expansion 
anyway might be called “choosers.” Notwithstanding their attacks 
on the Act in court, they beat Medicaid expansion then joined it. On 
the other side, states where the executive defended Medicaid 
expansion, or did not join the Health Care Cases on either side, and 
then opted into the program might be called “losers.” Again, as 
discussed below, they are losers only according to the logic of the 
cases. A few states sat on the sidelines, neither challenging nor 
adopting Medicaid expansion. 
Using these terms, only ten of the original state plaintiffs are 
“winners”: their executive sued for the right to avoid the Medicaid 
expansion, and their legislature exercised that right to stay out of 
the expanded program.70 Nineteen states are “losers”: their 
 
 69. Gluck and Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1733. Professors Gluck and Huberfeld 
break down the full history of state Medicaid expansion decisions into four waves: early, 
generous implementers; responses to the Health Care Cases; waivers and concessions; and 
renegotiated deals and political change. See id. at 1734–46. A table depicting these divisions 
shortly after the decision is printed in Johnstone, supra note *, at 18. 
 70.  See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (Sep. 20, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-
medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/ (identifying Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming (italics denote 
governor-plaintiffs)). Virginia, which brought a separate challenge to the Act, expanded its 
Medicaid program. See id.; see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 
2011). Oklahoma also sued separately, though the district court stayed the case pending 
resolution of the Health Care Cases, and after that decision the attorney general amended the 
complaint to bring the claims decided in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). See Oklahoma 
ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (E.D. Okla. 2014). 
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executive did not sue and their legislature opted in;71 twelve 
attorneys general and a governor from these states filed an amicus 
brief arguing the Medicaid expansion was constitutional.72 These 
states were losers in name only: they could not have expected a 
result in which their expansions of Medicaid was paid mostly by 
federal tax dollars from all states, including from states that opted 
out. The other sixteen state plaintiffs turn out to be “choosers”: their 
executive sued, and their legislature opted in anyway; these states 
also enjoyed a sweet deal, spending their co-plaintiffs’ tax dollars 
on the Medicaid expansion their executives once united to 
oppose.73 These state plaintiffs (including governors) who con-
fronted “a gun to the head” according to the Court turned out not 
to need the Act’s coercion after all. To the contrary, the Court’s 
decision gave these states new leverage over the federal govern-
ment. Many of these anti-ACA states that did adopt Medicaid also 
impose premiums or work requirements.74 Finally, there are just 
three states that sat out of both the challenge and (so far) the 
Medicaid expansion. Their inactivity was not due to disinterest, 
however, as the politics of the Affordable Care Act still played a 
significant role in campaigns for state offices.75 
 
 71.  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 70 (distinguishing Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, West Virginia). 
 72.  See Brief of Oregon, supra note 66, at 1 (Oregon, Vermont, California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, and the 
Governor of Washington). These parties, except Massachusetts and with the addition of the 
District of Columbia, also filed an amicus in support of severability. See Brief of California et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-
393), 2012 WL 293712. 
 73.  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 70 (marking out Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho (pending after initiative), Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah (pending after initiative), Washington) 
(italics denote governor-plaintiffs). 
 74.  Lilliard E. Richardson Jr., Medicaid Expansion During the Trump Presidency: The Role 
of Executive Waivers, State Ballot Measures, and Attorney General Lawsuits in Shaping 
Intergovernmental Relations, 49 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 437, 445–47 (2019). 
 75.  See, e.g., Andy Sher, GOP Wants AG Hopefuls Quizzed on ACA Support, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.timesfreepress.com/ 
news/local/story/2014/sep/07/gop-wants-ag-hopefuls-quizzed-on-aca-support/266513/ 
[https://perma.cc/PKG9-F65T] ( “Conservative criticism of current [Tennessee] Attorney 
General Bob Cooper, a Democrat and Chattanooga native who did not join the anti-
Obamacare lawsuit filed by mostly Republican state attorneys general.”). Missouri filed a 
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Even this picture is incomplete because many of these states 
divided on the Act long before the judgment in the Health Care Cases. 
Not surprisingly, a majority of the Congressional delegations in all 
but one of the eventual “winner” states voted against the Act or 
split.76 A majority of Congressional delegations in all but one of the 
eventual “loser” states voted for the Act or split.77 All but the last 
three of the “chooser” states, meanwhile, supported or split on the 
Act in their delegations.78 In the Health Care Cases, the then-current 
Democratic Senate majority leadership and then-former Democratic 
House majority leadership filed a brief supporting Medicaid 
expansion, including members of Congress from states who 
appeared on the other side.79 Further scrambling the picture, 539 
state legislators from all fifty states filed a brief supporting 
Medicaid expansion,80 while separate groups of state legislators 
from Indiana81 and Texas82 filed briefs opposing the Medicaid 
expansion. In an example of McCulloch’s principle of people acting 
in their states but not through them, the former group explained its 
interest “to represent their constituents and many other residents 
and State leaders in the challengers’ respective States who disagree 
with these legal challenges and support health care reform.”83 
Around the same time that state legislatures began expanding 
Medicaid coverage, state governors also faced a choice of whether 
 
brief arguing the severability of both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion 
from the rest of the Act, though it also noted (in a footnote), that “[t]he expanded Medicaid 
provisions in the ACA are also unconstitutional because they impose billions of dollars in 
new costs for states, and leave Missouri no option but to accept the burdens.” See Brief of 
Missouri Attorney General as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Florida v. Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 441262 *i, *4 n.1. 
 76.  See 155 CONG. REC. 13,891 (Dec. 24, 2009); 156 CONG. REC. 2,153 (Mar. 21, 2010). 
 77.  See 155 CONG. REC. 13,891 (Dec. 24, 2009); 156 CONG. REC. 2,153 (Mar. 21, 2010). 
 78.  See 155 CONG. REC. 13,891 (Dec. 24, 2009); 156 CONG. REC. 2,153 (Mar. 21, 2010); 
see also Johnstone, supra note *, at 18. 
 79.  See Brief of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Florida v. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 
WL 523365 (Michigan, Nevada, South Carolina, Washington). 
 80.  See Brief of State Legislators from the Fifty States, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Florida v. Dep’t Health & Human 
Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 588461. 
 81.  See Brief of Indiana State Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Florida v. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 160244. 
 82.  See Brief of Texas Public Policy Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Florida v. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 
WL 273134. 
 83.  Id. at *1. 
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to establish an exchange to market health insurance that complies 
with the Act or allow the federal government to establish an 
exchange for the state.84 Governors who established state exchanges 
empowered the states to control the marketing of health insurance 
to their residents. As Professors Gluck and Huberfeld explain, 
however, compromises between federal and state control arose out 
of  
the tension between the political pressure on state officials to 
publicly “resist” the ACA and the practical view many of those 
same officials held that it was not in the long-term interests of the 
states—their sovereign interests—to cede full control of their 
insurance markets to the federal government.85  
States that chose to rely on various forms of federal support for 
their enrollment platform could still opt into state-run exchanges. 
In states that did not establish an exchange, the federal government 
ran the exchange.  
State decisions of whether or not to establish an insurance 
exchange under the Act tracked partisan positions on the Act itself 
more than even the Medicaid expansion decisions. Nearly all states 
that established state exchanges had supported the Act in Congress, 
and nearly all states that left the exchanges to federal control had 
opposed the Act in Congress. Notable exceptions include Idaho 
(which established a state exchange to retain local control) and 
Hawaii (which turned to a federal exchange after technological 
troubles).86 The stronger alignment of political positions against 
both the Act and the state exchanges seems contradictory. Unlike a 
state’s opposition to the Act itself, state’s refusal to establish an 
exchange supports a greater assertion of federal policy, and a loss 
of state policy control, through the establishment of a federal 
exchange. This may be what Professors Gluck and Huberfeld call 
“federalism for federalism’s own sake”87: given the political cost of 
supporting any implementation of the Act in some states, and the 
policy flexibility in achieving some measure of state input into 
hybrid exchanges, state officials could afford to reject state 
 
 84.  Fahey, supra note 14, at 1561 (explaining state consent procedure to establish 
exchanges). 
 85.  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1767. 
 86.  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 70. 
 87.  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1730. 
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exchanges even when they could not afford to reject Medicaid 
expansion.   
C. King v. Burwell 
Soon after the split decision in the Health Care Cases, upholding 
the individual mandate to purchase health insurance but invalid-
ating the state mandate to expand Medicaid, the states lined up 
again in the next major challenge to the Affordable Care Act. 
Although the question presented involved a matter of statutory 
interpretation—whether the Act authorized tax-credit subsidies for 
an “[e]xchange established by the State” in federally operated 
exchanges—practically, the stakes for the states were similar to 
those in the Health Care Cases. As the Supreme Court explained in 
King v. Burwell, the subsidies at issue prevented a “death spiral” of 
declining enrollment and increasing premiums, without which the 
Act would not operate as planned.88 
For the half-dozen challenger states in King, the case was a 
chance to win the victory that eluded them in the Health Care Cases: 
the failure of the Act as a practical, if not a constitutional, matter. 
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia, all duly repre-
sented by attorneys general, filed a brief in support of the subsidies 
for federally operated exchanges.89 The amici included ten states 
that had not established state exchanges, five of which had opposed 
the Act in the Health Care Cases90 and, with the exception of 
Mississippi, had expanded Medicaid or would do so soon. Current 
and former Democratic members of Congress who supported the 
Act also filed a brief, joined by current and former state legislators.91 
On the other side, six states opposed the subsidy, including West 
Virginia, which had not opposed the Act in the Health Care Cases 
and had just expanded Medicaid.92 In a standalone brief, Indiana 
 
 88.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015). 
 89.  See Brief of the Commonwealths of Va. et al., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) 
(No. 14-114). 
 90.  Maine, Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (through the 
attorney general or governor). 
 91.  See Brief of Members of Congress and State Legislatures as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
 92.  See Brief of the States of Oklahoma et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) (opposing states were Alabama, Georgia, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia). 
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and several of its public school corporations opposed the subsidies 
because it triggered an “employer mandate” of minimum essential 
health coverage.93 Several state legislators from Ohio (which had 
expanded Medicaid by this time) and Tennessee (which had not) 
also argued against the subsidies based on federalism and the 
inapplicability of deference canons.94 State legislators from 
Virginia, arguing opposite their attorney general, filed a brief 
opposing the subsidies,95 as did Republican members of Congress.96 
D. Hobby Lobby and Zubik v. Burwell 
As the Obama Administration drew to a close with the 
Affordable Care Act still intact, several states joined a more focused 
challenge to rules under the Act that required employers or health 
plans to cover contraceptive care. Unlike the Health Care Cases, King, 
or Texas,97 these cases did not present existential threats to the Act 
and state policymakers’ implementation of or resistance to it. 
Instead, they presented a more typical opportunity for states to 
engage in ideological signaling along partisan lines based on broad 
assertions of general state interests in religious liberty,98 corporate 
governance,99 and gender equity.100 Although state attorneys general 
decisions enjoy substantial political latitude to author or sign onto 
amicus briefs due to their low salience, this also may free them to 
be more partisan in ideologically charged cases with low stakes for 
their states but high potential for favorable messaging with their 
political base.101 As such, they do not present federalism or state 
 
 93.  See Brief of Amici Curiae of Indiana and 39 Indiana Public School Corporations in 
Support of Petitioners at 1–3, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
 94.  See Brief of Galen Institute and State Legislatures at 21–24, King v. Burwell, 135 S. 
Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
 95.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of Virginia State Delegates et al. in Support of Petitioners 
at 13–15, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114); Brief of the Commonwealths of Virginia et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 15–16, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). 
 96.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Senators John Cornyn et al. in Support of Petitioners at 
4–6, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). 
 97.  See infra Section II.E. 
 98.  See Brief of the State of Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
1–3, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
 99.  See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Michigan et al. for Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, 
Mardel at 3–4, Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
 100.  See Brief of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Federal Petitioners and 
Respondents Kathleen Sebelius, et al. at 2–4, Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
 101.  See Johnstone, supra note 27, at 607. 
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powers issues of the same magnitude as the other challenges, but 
they do provide a baseline measure of ideological mobilization by 
attorneys general in the absence of the broader practical and policy 
concerns raised by the global challenges to the Act. 
In early 2014, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby presented the question of 
whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects a closely-
held corporation’s faith-based refusal to cover contraception under 
rules promulgated pursuant to the Act.102 The Court held that the 
law did protect the corporation’s refusal, in part, because there 
were less restrictive means of providing contraceptive care through 
an insurer’s funding instead of the employer’s funding.103 Zubik v. 
Burwell, briefed two years later in 2016, followed up with a 
challenge to the rule requiring religious organizations to cover 
contraceptive care for their employees.104 With thirty-seven states 
arguing one side or the other, participation in both cases was nearly 
as broad as participation in the Health Care Cases, and broader than 
in King. Unlike in the Health Care Cases though, all states appeared 
through their attorneys general, again fitting the conventional 
model of state amicus work. 
The lineups were predictable from the states’ earlier positions 
on the Act, with eighteen of the twenty-one states challenging the 
Act in Hobby Lobby, and fifteen of the nineteen states challenging 
the Act in Zubik drawn from the original twenty-six Florida state 
plaintiffs. Thirteen of the sixteen states supporting the Act in Hobby 
Lobby, and thirteen of the eighteen states supporting the Act in 
Zubik, earlier joined as amicus curiae supporting the Act in Florida. 
But the mix of states changed. Five states that joined Hobby Lobby 
sat out Zubik,105 and five new states joined.106 Arkansas and Nevada, 
two new state opponents of the Act who joined in Zubik, did so after 
electing Republican attorneys general to succeed Democrats in 
 
 102. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–90 (2014). 
 103. Id. at 730. 
 104. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016). Instead of deciding the case, the 
Court vacated the judgments below to encourage parties to find an implementation of the 
rule that did not require action by the organization to trigger the insurer’s coverage of 
contraception. Id. at 1560. 
 105.  Alaska, Louisiana, North Dakota, and South Dakota opposing, with Maine 
supporting. 
 106.  Arkansas and Nevada opposing, with Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia 
supporting. 
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2014.107 The remaining eight states that joined or left these cases saw 
no partisan switches in attorneys general, so those states’ decisions 
may have arisen from ordinary office concerns such as staffing or 
retail politics at the state level. The ebb and flow of attorney general 
involvement in the contraceptive cases serves as a reminder that, 
even in ideologically charged cases aligned along national partisan 
lines, these local factors still matter.108 
E. Texas v. United States 
After the Democrats took back the House of Representatives in 
the 2018 mid-term elections, the Republicans’ opportunity to repeal 
of the Affordable Care Act ended. In the states, however, a new 
challenge to the Act gained momentum. In February 2018, Texas 
led eighteen states (through their attorneys general and two 
governors) in a final and novel challenge to the entire Act.109 The 
 
 107. In Arkansas, Leslie Rutledge (R) succeeded Dustin McDaniel (D) in 2015; in 
Nevada Adam Laxalt (R) succeeded Catherine Cortez Masto (D) in 2015. Paul Nolette, 
Attorneys General by State, 1980-2018, PAUL NOLETTE (last visited Nov. 9, 2019), https:// 
paulnolette.com/attorneys-general-data/list-of-attorneys-general-by-state-1980-2014/. 
 108.  Johnstone, supra note 27, at 605–07 (discussing the interplay of ideological and 
institutional factors in a state’s decision to join an amicus brief). 
 109.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Texas v. United States, 340 
F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:18-cv-00167-O), 2018 WL 1061440, at paras. 2–3 (filed 
Feb. 26, 2018). An amended complaint restyled the Mississippi Governor’s title from 
“Mississippi, by and through Governor Phil Bryant” to “Governor Phil Bryant of the State of 
Mississippi.” Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Texas, 340 
F. Supp. 3d 579 (No. 4:18-cv-00167-O), 2018 WL 8262615 (filed Apr. 23, 2018). 
  The two governors’ claims to represent the state pitted their executive powers 
against the common law powers of their states’ attorneys general. Mississippi’s governor 
brought suit under a statute authorizing “foreign suits” outside the state “for the recovery 
of any moneys due or owing to the state, or upon any claim or demand on which the state is 
entitled to sue.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-1-33 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). But see MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 7-5-1 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“The Attorney General . . . . shall be 
the chief legal officer and advisor for the state . . . . He shall have the powers of the Attorney 
General at common law and, except as otherwise provided by law, is given the sole power 
to bring or defend a lawsuit on behalf of a state agency, the subject matter of which is of 
statewide interest.”); Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP, 744 F. Supp. 2d. 
590, 595 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (quoting Gandy v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 279 So. 2d 648, 649 (Miss. 
1973)) (“Under Mississippi common law, the Attorney General is a constitutional officer 
possessed of . . . . the right to institute, conduct and maintain all suits necessary for the 
enforcement of the laws of the State, preservation of order and the protection of public 
rights.”). Maine’s governor simply cited the office’s vesting clause. ME. CONST. art. V, Pt. 1, 
§ 1 (“The supreme executive power of this State shall be vested in a Governor.”). But see Lund 
ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554, 558 (Me. 1973) (“As the chief law officer of the State, [the 
Attorney General] may, in the absence of some express legislative restriction to the contrary, 
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plaintiffs’ argued: (1) a majority of the Supreme Court in the Health 
Care Cases opined the Act’s individual mandate exceeded Congress’s 
powers under the Commerce Clause and could be upheld only as 
an exercise of the taxing power; (2) in 2017, Congress eliminated the 
tax penalty, which the Court considered essential to the Act’s 
function in King v. Burwell; and (3) “[o]nce the heart of the ACA—
the individual mandate—is declared unconstitutional, the 
remainder of the ACA must also fall.”110 Maryland filed a separate 
action seeking a declaration that the Act is enforceable, with a 
supporting brief amicus curiae from fourteen states and the District 
of Columbia, including two states that did not intervene in Texas: 
New Mexico and Pennsylvania.111 
In December 2018, a district court in Fort Worth agreed with the 
state plaintiffs and declared the individual mandate unconsti-
tutional and inseverable from the remainder of the Act.112 Although 
both Maine and Mississippi appeared through their governors, the 
district court referred to Mississippi but not Maine as a party, and 
collectively referred to the group as “the State Plaintiffs.”113 
Meanwhile, more states joined the case as intervenors. In May 2018, 
the district court granted permissive intervention to sixteen states 
and the District of Columbia, all of which appeared through their 
attorneys general.114 On both sides of the issue, the lineups were 
familiar. The twenty original state plaintiffs that appeared through 
Republican attorneys general and governors included sixteen of the 
twenty-six plaintiffs in the Health Care Cases, plus three states whose 
attorneys general switched from Democrats to Republicans in the 
 
exercise all such power and authority as public interests may, from time to time require, and 
may institute, conduct, and maintain all such actions and proceedings as he deems necessary 
for the enforcement of the laws of the State, the preservation of order, and the protection of 
public rights.”). 
 110.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 109, at para. 7. 
 111.  See Maryland v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 3d 288 (D. Md. 2019). 
 112.  Texas, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 619. 
 113.  Id. at 591. Mississippi pleaded a rarely cited statute authorizing the governor to 
“order and direct suits to be brought for and in the name of the state in any other state or 
foreign jurisdiction for the recovery of any moneys due or owing to the state, or upon any 
claim or demand on which the state is entitled to sue.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 7-1-33. Maine, in 
contrast, merely cited the governor’s role as chief executive. See ME. CONST. art. V, Pt. 1, § 1. 
The district court also referred to “twenty-six states” in NFIB. Texas, 340 F. Supp 3d at 587. 
 114.  Order, Texas, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (No. 4:18-cv-00167-O) (filed May 16, 2018). 
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intervening years.115 Maine’s Governor and Wisconsin through its 
attorney general dropped out as plaintiffs after the 2018 elections 
switched those officers from Republicans to Democrats.116 Four 
other state plaintiffs in the Health Care Cases joined the 16 state 
intervenors and D.C. to defend the Act on appeal in the Fifth 
Circuit.117 The United States, which conceded part of the Act was 
inseverable in the district court,118 declined to defend any of the Act 
on appeal.119 In December 2019, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
state plaintiffs that the individual mandate was now 
unconstitutional, but remanded to the district court for 
reconsideration of severability in its remedy; the Supreme Court 
granted California’s petition and Texas’s cross-petition for certiorari 
in March 2020.120 
The stakes are high for the severability argument: in addition to 
unravelling a range of health care policy reforms, a final judgment 
of non-severability would invalidate the Medicaid expansion 
adopted by the legislatures or people (by initiative) of thirty-six 
states and the District of Columbia. Of the twenty-one state 
 
 115.  In Arkansas, Leslie Rutledge (R) succeeded Dustin McDaniel (D) in 2015 by 
election; in Tennessee, Herbert Slattery III (R) succeeded Robert Cooper (D) in 2015 by 
appointment; in West Virginia, Patrick Morrissey (R) succeeded Darrell McGraw (D) in 2013 
by election. Nolette, supra note 107. In Missouri, Josh Hawley (R) succeeded Chris Koster (D) 
in 2017 by election; Eric Schmitt (R) succeeded Hawley in 2019 by appointment after 
Hawley’s election to United States Senator. Id.; Press Release, Governor Mike Parson 
Announces Eric Schmitt as the Next Attorney General of Missouri (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-mike-parson-announces-eric-
schmitt-next-attorney-general-missouri. 
 116. In Wisconsin, Josh Kaul (D) succeeded Brad Schimel (R) in 2019 by election. See 
Nolette, supra note 107; Josh Kaul, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN. (last visited Nov. 9, 2019), 
https://www.naag.org/naag/attorneys-general/whos-my-ag/wisconsin/josh-kaul.php. 
Maine’s former attorney general, Janet Mills (D), succeeded Paul LePage (R) as governor in 
2019; in late 2018 Attorney General Mills’s office opined that “[t]o the extent that Paul R. 
LePage seeks to represent the interests of the State of Maine in this lawsuit, such participation 
is not authorized by law.” Steven Porter, Maine Reiterates That It Isn’t A Plaintiff in ACA 
Lawsuit, HEALTHLEADERS (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/ 
strategy/maine-reiterates-it-isnt-plaintiff-aca-lawsuit. 
 117.  Colorado, Michigan, and Nevada, whose attorneys general switched to 
Democrats, and Iowa, whose governor opposed the Act and whose attorney general 
defended it. 
 118. Texas, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 591. 
 119. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Clerk of the Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit (Mar. 25, 2019), https://affordablecareactlitigation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2019/03/doj-anti-aca-letter-3-25.pdf. 
 120.  Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted 140 S.Ct. 1262 
(Mar. 2, 2020) (Nos. 19-840 & 19-1019). 
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intervenors defending the Act, all represented by attorneys general, 
all but North Carolina have expanded Medicaid. Surprisingly, 
eight of the eighteen state plaintiffs challenging the Act also expan-
ded Medicaid, including Nebraska and Utah, whose voters recently 
approved expansion through ballot measures yet to be fully 
implemented. These state attorneys general risk their own legis-
lature’s or people’s adoption of Medicaid expansion in their attack 
against the entire Act. Two Medicaid-expansion states with 
Republican attorneys general filed their own brief arguing the 
individual mandate was unconstitutional, but that it was severable 
and the non-severability doctrine itself was constitutionally 
problematic.121 
As Texas v. United States works its way through the Supreme 
Court, it is shaping up to be the broadest state conflict over the 
Affordable Care Act yet. Forty-three states plus the District of 
Columbia and the governor (and former attorney general) of 
Kentucky,have joined the case as plaintiffs, intervenor-defendants, 
or amici curiae, seven more than the number of states with officials 
on briefs in the Health Care Cases. The lineup in Texas suggests, after 
nearly a decade of implementation, the weight of state attorney 
general opinion on the Affordable Care Act has shifted. In the first 
round of litigation, twenty-four states (including Virginia’s sepa-
rate unsuccessful action) and three governors challenged the Act, 
while only fourteen states (including Missouri’s severability-focused 
brief) defended it. Currently twenty-six states (including Montana 
and Ohio’s severability-focused brief) are defending the act in 
Texas, and eighteen states remain plaintiffs. With each challenge to 
the Act, the number of state opponents has dropped, and the 
number of state supporters has risen, in each case from Florida & 
Virginia (27-14), to Hobby Lobby (21-16), to Zubik (19-18), to Texas & 
Maryland (16-27), with King (6-23) as an outlier potentially due to 
its question presented being statutory, not constitutional, in nature. 
The shift in the states roughly reflects the shift in national public 
opinion, with a plurality or majority disapproving of the Act 
 
 121.  Brief of Amicus Curiae States of Ohio & Mont. in Support of Neither Party, Texas 
v. United States, No. 19-10011 (5th Cir. filed July 9, 2010) (brief filed Apr. 1, 2019). 
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through 2016, and an unsteady majority approving of the Act since 
early 2017.122 
III. HOW TO SPEAK FOR THE STATES MORE CLEARLY 
State challenges to the Affordable Care Act provide a natural 
experiment for testing some of the factors at play in state public law 
litigation. Under the Act, and in the wake of the Health Care Cases 
and King, different branches of state government face different 
political choices that help to shape each state’s policy landscape. 
Congressional delegations may or may not vote for the Act. 
Legislatures may or may not expand Medicaid under the Act. 
Governors may or may not establish state exchanges under the Act. 
Attorneys general may or may not challenge some or all of the Act 
in multistate and related litigation. And voters may or may not 
return these officials to office in the next election. 
Who, then, speaks for the states, and for whom do they speak? 
It’s complicated. The people of each state elect officials with distinct 
but overlapping mandates to make policy for the state in Congress, 
the state capitol, and the courts. Over time, the politics of each office 
and the state as a whole shift in response to both state and national 
developments. In the implementation of or resistance to federal 
policy, partisan federalism mobilizes state officials along national 
political lines.123 It plays an increasingly important—and for 
federalists, troubling—role in the alignment of state attorneys 
general with national parties rather than state interests.124 Yet as 
Professors Gluck and Huberfeld note, “[t]he ACA story, to be sure, 
 
 122.  See KFF Health Tracking Poll: The Public’s Views on the ACA, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.kff.org/interactive/kff-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-
views-on-the-aca/#?response=Favorable—Unfavorable&aRange=all (53% approve and 41% 
disapprove in September 2019, with recent majority support beginning in February 2017); 
Lydia Saad, ‘Obamacare’ Still Earns a Split Decision From Americans, GALLUP (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/249146/obamacare-earns-split-decision-americans.aspx 
(50% approve and 48% disapproved in April 2019, with recent majority support beginning 
in April 2017). 
 123.  See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 51, at 1080 (“Put in only slightly caricatured terms, 
Republican-led states challenge the federal government when it is controlled by Democrats, 
while Democratic-led states challenge the federal government when it is controlled by 
Republicans. States oppose federal policy because they are governed by individuals who 
affiliate with a different political party than do those in charge at the national level, not be- 
cause they are states as such.”). 
 124.  See Johnstone, supra note 27, at 609–614 (discussing the increasing partisanship of 
state attorneys general over the past two decades). 
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illustrates a key role for partisanship, but in many ways the 
partisanship has been superficial.”125 Their study of state legislative 
and executive implementation of the Act demonstrates “an 
intrastate dynamic that undermines the lockstep partisan account 
of state-federal interaction as the only, or even dominant, game in 
town.”126 This dynamic extends from the statehouse to the 
courthouse in the various legal challenges to and defenses of the 
Act by state attorneys general. 
Few states maintained a united front throughout a decade of 
Affordable Care Act litigation and policymaking. A reliably 
Democratic cast of states bought into Medicaid expansion, estab-
lished state exchanges, and fought for the Act every step of the way 
in court, including California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and New York and the 
District of Columbia. Hawaii would be the eleventh state of this 
group, but for technical difficulties that caused it to abandon its 
state exchange. Delaware uniformly supported the Act in court, 
though only after its lone representative voted against the Act in 
Congress.  
On the other side, only Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina 
held out from Medicaid expansion and state exchanges and fought 
against the Act in every case discussed above from the Health Care 
Cases to King to Texas, with Nebraska excluded from the hold-outs 
only because its citizens approved Medicaid expansion by ballot. 
Not even the lead plaintiffs in the primary constitutional cases, 
Florida and Texas, showed up in King. Another dozen states across 
the partisan spectrum—from Wyoming to Rhode Island—sat out 
one or more rounds of the legal and policy contests.  
The remaining half of the states took mixed positions over the 
decade, meaning the state’s attorney general bucked other state 
officials or the Congressional delegation, or the state’s internal 
politics shifted on the issue even as national partisanship hardened. 
Just as partisanship cannot fully account for state decisions on 
implementing the Act, it does not fully determine state positions on 
challenging or defending the Act. There are lessons for federalism 
where partisanship does not dominate state public law litigation. 
 
 125.  Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1751. 
 126.  Id. 
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Some of those lessons can inform the states about the possibility of 
the attorney general’s independence from other state officials as 
well as national parties, and its value in discerning and advancing 
state-based views of the public interest. Other lessons can inform 
the courts about the complexity of accountability rationales for 
federalism, and ways to improve accountability in both doctrine 
and procedure. 
A. Lessons for the States 
In the midst of a great political debate, such as the decade-long 
Affordable Care Act controversy, state attorneys general still enjoy 
significant autonomy in their litigation decisions. For students of 
the attorneys general, this comes as no surprise given the office’s 
structural independence in state law and its political independence 
in state practice. In a detailed study of state amicus briefs, Professors 
Maggie Lemos and Kevin Quinn find “partisanship does not 
provide a full explanation” of attorney general litigation, and that 
in many less ideological cases attorneys general “are acting contrary 
to partisan motivations.”127 In light of increasing national partisan 
pressures on state officials in general, and state attorneys general in 
particular, however, these findings are encouraging for federalism. 
The attorney general’s autonomy runs along two dimensions, one 
across the state’s branches of government and the other between 
the state and national political parties. 
1. Intrastate Independence 
A state’s attorney general is empowered to act independently 
of policy decisions made by the state’s legislature and governor. For 
example, several attorneys general continued to attack the practical 
operation (in King) and legal validity (in Texas) of the Act despite 
their state’s initial support for the Act, the expansion of Medicaid, 
the establishment of a state exchange, and even the governor’s or 
some legislators’ appearance on the other side of the same case. 
Although it occurred less frequently, other attorneys general defen-
ded the Act despite their state delegation’s original opposition to 
the Act, their legislature’s hostility to Medicaid expansion or state 
 
 127.  Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General 
as Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1263 (2015). 
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exchanges, their predecessor’s leadership in litigation against the 
Act, or the appearance of fellow state officials on the other side of 
the same case. To be sure, some of this apparent independence 
within a state is traceable to the dependence of some attorneys 
general upon national political forces. This kind of intrastate conflict 
may compromise an attorney general’s fidelity to state interests in 
court, or it may reflect the independence of state officials on the 
other side. The other officials also may be captive to opposing 
national political forces, and any particular analysis of intrastate 
independence requires a localized account of state political culture 
and interests.128 
Political forces occasionally will overwhelm intrastate indepen-
dence. One emerging check on this state-level autonomy is several 
states’ legislative “power plays” to hobble attorney general powers 
as a prior administration leaves office. Professor Paul Nolette 
recounts how the Washington legislature threatened to reduce the 
attorney general’s budget for joining the Health Care Cases, while the 
Georgia legislature threatened to impeach the attorney general for 
refusing to join.129 In Wisconsin, the lame-duck legislature passed a 
law restricting the attorney general’s control of litigation, including 
litigation against the federal government, after the attorney general 
joined Texas then lost re-election. Professor Miriam Seifter describes 
the emergence of “power play” litigation under state constitutions, 
including controversies generated by state implementation of the 
Act, and demonstrates how a states’ own law and politics can check 
partisan entrenchment through enforcement of state constitutional 
separation of powers.130 For example, in a separate lawsuit by the 
 
 128.  See Johnstone, supra note 27, at 606 (“As lawyers with a duty to the state’s overall 
policy agenda, attorneys general must discern that agenda in the complicated ideological 
commitments of its electorate as filtered through the state’s constitution and laws, as well as 
broader economic and social interests.”); Lemos & Young, supra note 21, at 113–17 (critically 
considering the state attorney general’s competence, relative to private litigants, to represent 
the public interest); see also Johnstone, supra note 13, at 460–67 (reviewing the persistence of 
state political cultures with attention to election laws). 
 129.  See Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 
1227 (2019). Wisconsin withdrew from Texas v. United States during a temporary stay of the 
Wisconsin law’s restrictions in the spring of 2019. Mark Sommerhauser, Federal court OKs 
Josh Kaul’s request to withdraw Wisconsin from two Obamacare lawsuits, WISC. ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/federal-court-oks-josh-kaul-s-
request-to-withdraw-wisconsin/article_8f05dceb-0b86-510e-a346-a6e99fea8bae.html. 
 130.  See  Seifter, supra note 129, at 1220, 1233 (describing litigation over the Maine 
governor’s duty to implement a citizen-initiated Medicaid expansion). 
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City of Seattle to force Washington’s attorney general to withdraw 
from the Health Care Cases, the state supreme court upheld the 
attorney general’s independence under state law.131 Both sides 
complained the other was motivated by politics,132 but the case 
shows how state law can manage intrastate conflicts in a way that 
leaves the state’s public in charge. As Professor Seifter argues, 
“[p]ower play litigation is dialogue-forcing in a state realm that 
needs dialogue,” namely the value of state separation of powers to 
state policy and legal deliberations.133 
2. Interstate and National Independence 
State attorneys general also can exercise independence from 
their national parties, as evidenced by the surprising number of 
times attorneys general do not sign onto partisan multistate briefs. 
The conventional wisdom held, at least before the recent partisan 
polarization of states and their attorneys general, that the 
credibility of a brief increased with the number of states signing.134 
Sign-ons are a low-cost signaling mechanism of an attorney 
general’s fidelity to the party’s position in a case, in terms of both 
office resources and political capital. Yet one-third or more of states 
stayed on the sidelines in the highest-profile Affordable Care Act 
cases. Given the practical ease of joining an amicus brief and the 
political value of affiliating with a national partisan alliance, the 
absence of so many states suggests that local interests are entering 
into attorney general calculations. 
Those attorneys general that did join briefs nearly always toed 
the party line. Indeed, taking a state Congressional delegation’s 
original support for the Act as the baseline, attorney general 
decisions to join briefs on either side of the challenges were more 
polarized than the legislative decisions to expand Medicaid and the 
 
 131.  See City of Seattle v. McKenna, 259 P.3d 1087, 1093 (Wash. 2011) (“The people of the 
state of Washington have, by statute, vested the attorney general with broad authority, and 
Attorney General McKenna’s decision to sue to enjoin the enforcement of the PPACA falls 
within that broad authority.”). 
 132.  See Rachel La Corte, State Attorney General Rob McKenna’s power question in 
lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010) (the State Democratic Party Chairman said the 
attorney general “made a decision to appease tea-party supporters by taking a position on a 
very political issue,” while a Republican political consultant said “[t]he 2012 campaign has 
begun”). 
 133.  See Seifter, supra note 129, at 1220–21. 
 134.  Johnstone, supra note 27, at 620–21. 
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executive decisions to establish a state exchange.135 In other words, 
the state delegations’ original votes on the Act were more highly 
correlated with the states’ subsequent litigation positions than with 
the states’ decisions about actually implementing the Act in the 
state. Two of the most polarized brief lineups were in the most 
highly charged but low-stakes cases: Hobby Lobby and Zubik. King, 
again the outlier, featured a small core of ideologically consistent 
states on the challengers’ side. In some cases, the partisan pull was 
so strong that it compromised the attorneys’ general institutional 
loyalty to their office, such as when they solicited sign-ons from 
governors in states where the brief lacked attorney general support, 
and thereby undermined the authority of the attorney general to 
speak for that state in court.136 
B. Lessons for the Courts 
A decade of state litigation holds both doctrinal and procedural 
lessons for the courts, too. First, the diversity of intrastate positions 
and interstate coalitions in the Affordable Care Act litigation 
complicates the conventional accountability-based justifications for 
elements of federalism doctrine. In elaborating federalism princi-
ples, the courts claim to clarify lines of political accountability from 
voters to their federal or state elected officials.  Those lines blur 
when state officials—empowered by federalism doctrine itself—
identify themselves through their opposition to or support for 
federal policy. The courts should be realistic about what kinds of 
accountability federalism can serve.  
1. Clarifying accountability in doctrine 
Recall the scorecard of state litigants from the Health Care Cases 
and their positions through the remaining cases. Across this wide 
variety of contradictory legal policy and strategy choices within 
each state, what kind of accountability could possibly emerge? Is 
there more accountability in the “chooser” states whose attorneys 
general led the charge against the Affordable Care Act, after their 
 
 135.  For these purposes, polarization is measured as the difference between the 
average weighted congressional delegation vote on either side of a case (e.g., Texas v. United 
States) or implementation of a policy (e.g., Medicaid expansion). See infra Appendix. 
 136.  Johnstone, supra note 27, at 613. 
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Congressional delegations voted for the Act and before their 
statehouses gladly signed up under the Act once the constitutional 
dust settled? Or is there more accountability in the “loser” states 
whose Congressional delegations, attorneys general, and state-
houses all supported the Act even before the Health Care Cases 
brought them a windfall of subsidies from the opt-out states’ tax 
dollars? Can the states that stood on principled opposition to the 
Act, from the Capitol to the courthouse to the statehouse, only to 
see their tax dollars go to their political and legal opponent states, 
really be considered “winners” at all?  And what of accountability 
in the apparently indifferent states that neither challenged the Act 
nor implemented Medicaid expansion? States were buffeted by 
aggressive campaigns seeking to hold attorneys general, legislators, 
and governors accountable in state elections for what began at the 
Federal level with Congressional votes for or against the Act.137  
The Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases may be a superficial 
victory for an anti-coercion rule of federalism, but any claim of 
victory for accountability (the principle that supports the anti-
coercion rule) is incoherent.138 Instead, as implementation procee-
ded in statehouses and the legal challenges piled up in courthouses, 
all while later Congresses and a new President worked to 
undermine it, the Affordable Care Act presented one opportunity 
after another for state and federal officials to pass the buck back and 
forth from branch to branch, sovereign to sovereign.139 “Since the 
 
 137.  See, e.g., Erik C. Anderson, Bucy, Fox Trade Jabs, Ads in High-stakes AG Race, 
MADISONIAN (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.madisoniannews.com/bucy-fox-trade-jabs-ads-
in-high-stakes-ag-race/ [https://perma.cc/Z2SF-MNTD] (“[A]ssistant Montana attorney 
general candidate [Pam Bucy] blasted [candidate Tim] Fox’s focus on the federal health  
care law, saying it has overshadowed discussion of the office’s principal 
duties . . . .  Fox . . . defends his focus on Obamacare . . . [and] would have joined that effort 
[state attorneys general in the challenge to the Act].”). 
 138.  See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law, 112 NW. 
U. L. REV. 989, 1047 (2018) (“There is no evidence that voters’ attributions of responsibility or 
retrospective decisions—such as they are—actually would be attenuated [if the federal 
government required the states to enforce federal policy]. There is only a status quo that is 
not entirely devoid of accountability, and a suspicion that things might change for the worse 
if federal interference intensified. This suspicion is not wholly fanciful, but it is still a flimsy 
foundation for a claim of constitutional stature.”). 
 139. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 828 (1998) (“The 
difficulty with such political accountability arguments is that they overlook the complexity 
inherent in any system of federalism that always has the potential to confuse voters and 
thereby undermine political accountability.”). 
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2016 presidential election,” Professors Gluck and Huberfeld find 
“the citizenry is deeply confused about the implications of 
repealing the ACA, what it accomplished, whether it even exists, 
and who is accountable for what.”140 Like the implementation of the 
Act itself, it is unclear whether the litigation over it “helped to 
strengthen or to diminish state local democracy.”141 
Who speaks for the state matters for political accountability. In 
general, as Professor Elizabeth Weeks Leonard argues, state 
officials are in a better position to voice their constituents’ prefer-
ences using the language of federalism.142 Professor David 
Schleicher explains, in his examination of the states’ implement-
tation of the Affordable Care Act, that because of difference in the 
salience of state elections, some state voices are more likely to 
express the voters’ views on state issues while others may simply 
express national partisanship.143 The federal government can choose 
who speaks for a state in what Bridget Fahey calls “consent proce-
dures” in cooperative federalism.144 Her argument can extend to the 
federal judiciary and its procedures for recognizing who may speak 
for states in court.  
Professor Schleicher further argues that governors are better 
positioned than legislators or low-profile statewide officials to reflect 
state interests rather than national partisan alignments, because 
governors’ impact on state policy is better understood by voters.145 
Thus, the regulations giving governors, not legislators or other 
officials, the power to establish state health insurance exchanges 
“are a straightforward effort to give authority to the parts of states 
most responsive to local opinion and least tied to Washington’s 
political fights.”146 On the other hand, the Court’s delegation to 
state legislatures of the Medicaid expansion option is more likely to 
lead to a “partisan federalism” alignment of state policy with 
 
 140.  Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1786. Early in the implementation and 
litigation of the Act, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard was more optimistic about public 
understanding: “Ongoing, post-enactment state resistance to each provision of ACA that 
rolls out should continue to inform the public about the new law in more digestible bites.” 
Leonard, supra note 16, at 164. 
 141.  Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 1785. 
 142.  Leonard, supra note 16, at 165. 
 143.  Schleicher, supra note 14. 
 144.  Fahey, supra note 14. 
 145.  Schleicher, supra note 14, at 795. 
 146.  Id. at 796. 
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national political positions.147 We might expect state attorneys 
general to fit closer to governors than state legislators in this model, 
and therefore speak as relatively faithful representatives of their 
state interests in litigation, at least more so than state legislators.148 
2. Clarifying accountability in procedure 
There are practical lessons of judicial procedure in this story as 
well. Professor Schleicher’s recommendations for the policymaking 
branches of state and federal government include enhancing the 
power of higher-profile state executive officials and helping voters 
to distinguish between state and federal issues.149 State attorneys 
general may be second to governors in salience to voters, but they 
do enjoy both constitutional and political primacy in the legal 
domain, where governors serve as understudies only when an 
attorney general will not represent the state on a case caption. 
Federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, have the power 
to reinforce the attorney general’s role in public law litigation and 
thereby increase accountability for who speaks for the states in 
court. Yet the federal courts fail to do so. It may seem a small thing 
to call governors appearing as individual officers a “state,” as the 
Court did in the Health Care Cases. But there are important norms of 
attorney general representation at the Court. These are reflected, for 
example, in Rule 37.4, which permits a state to appear as amicus 
curiae without leave “when submitted by its Attorney General.”150 
When governors or other state officials participate in attorney 
general briefs, they violate the rule and distort the identity of the 
“states” as a party. When used by governors and other state 
officials to bypass an attorney general with a different position on 
the case—including no position at all—it distorts the apparent 
composition of states signing on. The state plaintiffs in the Health 
Care Cases achieved this distortion by bringing governors aboard its 
 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 765 n.10 (“[S]tate supreme court judges and attorneys general are more 
prominent, while state insurance commissioners and local treasurers are less prominent and 
more likely to be second order. Existing research does not allow us to know in each instance 
whether these elections look more like gubernatorial races or legislative ones, although they 
likely either fall between those poles or are like legislative races, depending on their 
prominence.”). 
 149.  Id. at 772. 
 150.  SUP. CT. R. 37.4. 
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brief to increase the appearance of “state” representation in its 
caption, misleading the dissent with an apparent twenty-six state 
majority. The Court’s policing of this rule, in a way that ensures 
that attorneys general alone are able to speak for the states as such, 
would be a small victory for accountability in the Court’s opinions. 
It may also matter in the states, by clarifying for voters who does 
and does not have the power to set the state’s litigation agenda in 
these high-profile cases. 
CONCLUSION  
Among other values, federalism is supposed to serve the 
accountability of the federal and state governments, separately, to 
their citizens. Among other duties, state attorneys general are 
supposed to enforce that accountability, on behalf of their states’ 
citizens, in federal court. The Health Care Cases and their aftermath 
tested both of these suppositions in the teeth of the decade’s 
defining political and legal controversy around the Affordable Care 
Act. Neither federalism nor the office of state attorney general 
performed as the conventional models would suggest. Instead, 
from the day the Act was signed into law, state attorneys general 
mobilized along partisan lines in a continuation of the national 
political debate over the Act, framed in legal terms. A chorus of 
assorted state officials joined them, along similar partisan lines, to 
assert their own claims to speak for the state in court regardless of 
state law or federal procedure. The resulting waves of litigation 
blurred lines of accountability among officials within states and 
between the state and federal governments. 
A clearer conception of the states’ role in federalism can help 
bring these blurred lines back into focus. A primary condition for 
states to enjoy their autonomy as sovereigns is that they should 
decide who speaks for them. In the courts, including at the Supreme 
Court in federalism cases, that voice is almost always the state 
attorney general. Although, like most state officials, attorneys 
general are buffeted by accelerating partisan pressures, their 
positions grant them significant autonomy to give voice to state 
interests in public law litigation, including federalism interests in 
the state’s own autonomy. The courts, including the Supreme Court 
in federalism cases, can and should amplify the voice of attorneys’ 
general on behalf of the states, and distinguish it from the dissonant 
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voices of state officials who lack the authority or independence to 
speak for the states in court. Federalism starts with respecting the 
states’ own structures of political accountability. Only then can the 
courts begin to work out the doctrine accountability demands. 
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APPENDIX: STATES ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT151 













CT Ö 100% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
DC Ö 100% Ö (AG)* 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
HI 100% Ö/O (AG) 2014 Fed. Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
RI 100%  2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
VT Ö 100% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
ND 100% X (AG) 2014 Fed. Ö (AG) X (AG)  X (AG) 
MA Ö 95% Ö (AG)* 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
NY Ö 93% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
OR Ö 90% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State-Fed. Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
MD Ö 88% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
CO 86% X (AG) 2014 State  X (AG) X (AG) Ö (AG) 
NM Ö 83% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State-Fed. Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
WA 83% X (AG) / Ö (G) 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
WV 83%  2014 State-Ptr X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
CA Ö 82% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
WI 81% X (AG) X Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) √ (AG) 
IL Ö 79% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State-Ptr Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
MN 79%  2014 State   Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
NJ 77%  2014 Fed.    Ö (AG) 
MI 77% X (AG) 2014 State-Ptr  X (AG) X (AG) Ö (AG) 
NH 75%  2014 State-Ptr Ö (AG)  Ö (AG) √ (AG) 
PA 75% X (AG) 2015 Fed. Ö (AG)   Ö (AG) 
VA 68% X (AG) VA* 2018 Fed. Ö (AG)  Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
AR 63%  2014 State-Fed.   X (AG) X (AG) 
NV 58% X (G) 2014 State-Fed.   X (AG) Ö (AG) 
IA 55% Ö (AG) / X (G) 2014 State-Ptr. Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
IN 53% X (AG/L) 2015 Fed. X (AG)*   X (AG) 
DE Ö 50% Ö/O (AG) 2014 State-Ptr. Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) Ö (AG) 
ME 50% X (AG) 2019 Fed. Ö (AG) Ö (AG)  Ö (AG) 
MT 50%  2016 Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) O (AG) 
 
 151.  Includes Washington, D.C. for completeness. X = took a position opposed to the Act 
(in state column = consistently opposed the Act); Ö = took a position supporting the Act (in state 
column = consistently supported the Act); O = took another position. (AG) = Attorney General, 
(G) = Governor, (L) = Legislature. * = took position in different case raising same issue. Bold 
signifies opposition to the Act. 
ACA Vote: “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Roll Vote No. 396 Leg.,” 155 
Cong. Rec. S13891 (Dec. 24, 2009); “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Roll No. 165,” 
156 Cong. Rec. H2153 (Mar 21, 2010). The percentage is the average share of votes for the Act 
in the House and Senate delegations of the state. For example, a state with one Senator (50%) 
and no Representative (0%) voting for the act would show a vote of 25%. 
Florida v. DHHS: See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, Florida v. Dep’t. Health & 
Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400); Brief of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Florida v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-
400), 2012 WL 588460 [hereinafter Brief of Oregon] (supporting Medicaid expansion); Brief for 
State Petitioners (Severability), Florida v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) 
(Nos. 11-393 & 11-400); Brief of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
(Severability), Florida v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-
400), 2012 WL 293712; Brief of Missouri as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents (Severability), 
Florida v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400) 
Medicaid Expansion: See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 70. 
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OH 50% X (AG) 2014 Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) O (AG) 
NC 44%  X Fed. Ö (AG)   Ö (AG) 
FL 44% X (AG) X Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
MO 42% O (AG) X Fed.    X (AG) 
KY 33%  2014 State-Fed Ö (AG)   Ö (G) 
AZ 31% X (AG) 2014 Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
AK 25% X (AG) 2015 Fed.  X (AG)   
LA 25% X (AG) 2016 Fed.  X (AG)  X (AG) 
NE 25% X (AG) 2020 Fed. X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
SD 25% X (AG) X Fed.  X (AG)  X (AG) 
TX 17% X (AG/L) X Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
SC X 17% X (AG) X Fed. X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
TN 17%  X Fed.    X (AG) 
GA X 15% X (AG) X Fed. X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
KS 13% X (AG) X Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
MS 13% X (G) X Fed. Ö (AG)   X (AG) 
AL X 0% X (AG) X Fed. X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
ID 0% X (AG) 2020 State  X (AG) X (AG)  
OK 0%  X Fed. X (AG) X (AG)* X (AG)  
UT 0% X (AG) 2020 Fed.  X (AG) X (AG) X (AG) 
WY 0% X (AG) X Fed.    * 
 
 
* State Exchange: See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2020, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-
types/. 
King v. Burwell:  See Brief of the Commonwealths of Va. et al., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief of Members of Congress and State Legislatures as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief of the States 
of Oklahoma et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) 
(No. 14-114); Brief of Amici Curiae of Indiana and 39 Indiana Public School Corporations in 
Support of Petitioners at 1–3, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief of Galen 
Institute and State Legislatures, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Virginia State Delegates et al. in Support of Petitioners, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-
114); Brief of the Commonwealths of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, 
King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114); Brief of Amici Curiae Senators John Cornyn et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby: Brief of the State of Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief of Amici Curiae 
States of Michigan et al. for Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, Mardel, Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (Nos. 
13-354, 13-356); Brief of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Federal Petitioners and 
Respondents Kathleen Sebelius, et al., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
Zubik v. Burwell: Brief for the States of Texas, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 
15-119, 15-191); Brief for the States of California, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191). 
California v. Texas: Brief of the States of California et al., California v. Texas (No. 19-840) 
(filed May 6, 2020); Brief of the States of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, California v. Texas (No. 19-840) (filed May 13, 2020); Brief of Amici Curiae States of 
Ohio and Montana in Support of Neither Party, California v. Texas (Nos. 19-840 & 19-1019) 
(filed May 13, 2020); Consolidated Opening Brief on the Merits of State of Texas, et al. (Nos. 19-
840 & 19-1019) (filed June 25, 2020). 
